H5N8 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in the Republic of Korea: Epidemiology During the First Wave, from January Through July 2014  by Yoon, Hachung et al.
Osong Public Health Res Perspect 2015 6(2), 106e111
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.phrp.2015.01.005
pISSN 2210-9099 eISSN 2233-6052- ORIGINAL ARTICLE -H5N8 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in the
Republic of Korea: Epidemiology During the First
Wave, from January Through July 2014Hachung Yoon*, Oun-Kyong Moon, Wooseog Jeong, Jida Choi,
Young-Myong Kang, Hyo-Young Ahn, Jee-Hye Kim, Dae-Sung Yoo,
Young-Jin Kwon, Woo-Seok Chang, Myeong-Soo Kim, Do-Soon Kim,
Yong-Sang Kim, Yi-Seok Joo
Veterinary Epidemiology Division, Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency (QIA), Anyang, Korea.Received: November
30, 2014
Revised: December 30,
2014
Accepted: January 14,
2015
KEYWORDS:
H5N8,
highly pathogenic avian
influenza,
Republic of Korea*Corresponding author.
E-mail: heleney@korea.kr
This is an Open Access article distribu
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0
medium, provided the original work is pr
Copyright ª 2015 Korea Centers for DiseAbstract
Objectives: This study describes the outbreaks of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian
influenza (HPAI) in Korea during the first wave, from January 16, 2014 through
July 25, 2014. Its purpose is to provide a better understanding of the epidemi-
ology of H5N8 HPAI.
Methods: Information on the outbreak farms and HPAI positive wild birds was
provided by the Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency. The epidemiological
investigation sheets for the outbreak farms were examined.
Results: During the 7-month outbreak period (JanuaryeJuly 2014), H5N8 HPAI
was confirmed in 212 poultry farms, 38 specimens from wild birds (stools, birds
found dead or captured). Ducks were the most frequently infected poultry
species (159 outbreak farms, 75.0%), and poultry in 67 (31.6%) outbreak farms
was asymptomatic.
Conclusion: As in the previous four H5N1 epidemics of HPAI that occurred in
Korea, this epidemic of H5N8 proved to be associated with migratory birds.
Poultry farms in Korea can hardly be free from the risk of HPAI introduced via
migratory birds. The best way to overcome this geographical factor is to rein-
force biosecurity to prevent exposure of farms, related people, and poultry to
the pathogen.ted under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
) which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
operly cited.
ase Control and Prevention. Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. All rights reserved.
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On January 16, 2014, an outbreak of highly patho-
genic avian influenza (HPAI) had occurred on a breeder
duck farm located in Gochang, Jeollabuk-do, in the
southwest of the Republic of Korea. On the next day,
another case was reported by a meat duck farm in Buan,
Jeollabuk-do. These two farms were located within a 10-
km distance. Outbreaks were subsequently confirmed
almost every day until early April, 2014, and continued
at a lower rate until July 25, 2014 (total number of days,
191) in a total of 212 poultry farms. This epidemic
resulted in the slaughter of 13,061 birds in 548 farms,
with the total including both infected birds and pre-
emptive slaughter [1].
The first outbreak was immediately reported to the
World Organisation for Animal Health after its confir-
mation on January 17, 2014 [2]. Previously, research
papers on H5N8 avian influenza virus infection in
poultry and wild birds had been published from Ireland
[3], South Africa [4], United States [5], and China [6,7].
However, this report on the outbreak in Korea was the
first official notification of H5N8 HPAI since the Irish
epidemic in 1983 [8]. In April 2014, Japan notified the
World Organisation for Animal Health about an outbreak
of H5N8 HPAI in a broiler chicken farm in Kumamoto
Prefecture. The outbreak ended by one event [9].
Little is known about the epidemiological charac-
teristics of HPAI of virus type H5N8 owing to the
absence of a previous epidemic. This study describes the
outbreaks of HPAI that occurred in Korea from January
2014 to July 2014; its purpose is to provide better un-
derstanding of the epidemiology of H5N8 HPAI.2. Materials and methods
Information on the outbreak farms and HPAI positive
wild birds was extracted from the “Status of HPAI:
reception of specimen and laboratory confirmation,”
updated every day by the emergency response center of
the Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency. The epide-
miological investigation sheets for the 212 outbreak
farms were examined. The first draft of the investigation
sheet was written by the on-site investigation team based
on clinical examination and face-to-face interviews.
SatSacn version 9.3.1 (download from www.satscan.
org) was used to identify clusters according to space
and time.3. Results
3.1. Affected population
During the 7-month outbreak period (JanuaryeJuly
2014), H5N8 HPAI was confirmed in 212 poultry farms,
38 specimens from wild birds (stools, birds found deador captured), and nine other specimens taken at the
affected farms (stool samples, feathers, egg trays, sam-
ples from dogs). The majority of infected poultry spe-
cies were ducks (159 outbreak farms, 75.0%). Infection
was also confirmed in chickens (44 outbreaks, 20.8%)
and other kinds of poultry (nine outbreaks, 4.2%),
including mallards, Muscovy ducks, ostriches, and
geese.
The H5 antibody was detected in 25 poultry farms.
Both the H5N8 antigen and the H5 antibody were
detected in 14 farms, whereas only the H5 antibody was
detected in 11 farms. In the case of wild birds, anti-
bodies were detected in 24 individuals and the antigen
was also detected in 19 of the 24 birds. By contrast, the
H5 antibody was detected in dogs from 15 outbreak
farms.
3.2. Evolution of epidemic
The peak in the number of outbreaks was observed in
Week 5 of the epidemic. Outbreaks were continuously
confirmed for 19 consecutive weeks from the beginning
of the epidemic. In late May, 2014 the outbreak pattern
became sporadic. During the first 15 days from the start
of this HPAI epidemic (January 16e30, 2014), one or
more outbreaks were detected per day. During the
month of February, 2014, at least one outbreak per day
was reported for 26 days. In 2014, outbreaks were re-
ported on 22 days in March, 11 days in April, 4 days in
May, and another 4 days in June. The highest number of
outbreaks for 1 day was recorded on February 19, 2014
with 22 new detections. The outbreak status began to
lull in March, 2014. Although detection of HPAI in wild
birds was the highest in January, 2014 (18 cases), 13
cases were detected in February, 2014. HPAI in wild
birds continued to be detected into early May, 2014,
with five confirmed cases in March, 2014, one in April,
2014 and another in May, 2014 (Figure 1).
3.3. Geographical distribution of outbreaks
The 212 outbreak farms were detected in 41 counties
(or cities) of 17 provinces. Most of them (205 farms,
96.7%) were located in the western part of Korea.
Outbreak poultry farms and infection of wild birds were
reciprocally located within easy distance. Four spatio-
temporal clusters of outbreaks were detected, three of
which were statistically significant (p < 0.05). The most
significant cluster was found in Eumseong, where the
highest number of outbreak farms (40, 18.9%) was
detected. When the cluster was focused on the 19 sites
(38 cases) of H5N8 type HPAI in wild birds, the most
significant cluster was found to be around Donglim
Reservoir, followed by Eumseong, and then Naju and
Yeongam, Jeollanam-do (Figure 2).
The first outbreak breeder duck farm was located in
Gochang, and the subsequent 35 outbreaks during the
initial phase in January, 2014 and February, 2014 were
reported in the three adjacent counties in Jeollabuk-do:
Figure 1. Temporal distribution of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in poultry and wild birds from January 2014 to July 2014: the peak in number of outbreaks
was observed in Week 5 of the epidemic. Outbreaks were continuously confirmed during 19 consecutive weeks from the beginning of the epidemic. In late May, 2014, the outbreak pattern
became sporadic.
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Figure 2. Locations of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) positives wild birds and spatiotemporal clusters of HPAI
outbreak poultry farms detected using a space-time permutation model.
Epidemiology of H5N8 HPAI in Korea 109Gochang, Buan, and Jeongeup (Figure 3). All these
farms reared ducks (breeder or meat type), except for
one, which was a breeder of broiler chickens. They were
geographically distributed around Donglim Reservoir
within a 10-km radius, and the straight distance from the
west coast was <5 km (Figure 3). Farmers of these
premises testified that flights of large flocks of Baikal
teal (Anas formosa) came close to their farms, even
passing above the farms, approximately 2e3 weeks
prior to the outbreak. Some of them mentioned the
sound of dripping birds’ feces on the roof.4. Discussion
Based on the following three facts, the Korean H5N8
HPAI epidemic seemed to be introduced from abroad.
First, H5N8 avian influenza virus had never previously
been detected in Korea in the active surveillance ofpoultry and wild birds. More than 2.1 million specimens
were collected and tested at the laboratory from 2011 to
2013, after eradicating the last epidemic of H5N1 HPAI
in 2011 [10]. Second, phylogenetic analysis indicated
that the H5N8 HPAI virus isolated in the 2014 epidemic
in Korea likely originated from the novel H5N8 virus in
China [11]. Third, the movement of migratory birds
between eastern China and western Korea was revealed
in studies on tracking migration routes [12]. Genetic
sequences of identical isolates that were found in out-
breaks of wild birds and poultry farms also support the
key role of migratory birds [13].
In 2014 in Korea, outbreaks of HPAI continued even
in the summer season, a period of atmospheric condi-
tions that are unfavorable for the survival of viruses.
Meanwhile, the four countries with the highest number
of HPAI (H5 or H7) worldwide since 2004 are Vietnam,
Thailand, Egypt, and Bangladesh [8], all of which are
located in the subtropical zone. In Thailand, cases of
Figure 3. Geographical distribution of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI; H5N8) outbreak farms detected from January
2014 to February, 2014 around Donglim Reservoir: The first outbreak breeder duck farm was located in Gochang, and the sub-
sequent 35 outbreaks during the initial phase in January, 2014 and February, 2014 were reported in three adjacent countries of
Jeollabuk-do: Gochang, Buan, and Jeongeup.
110 H. Yoon, et alH5N1 have been detected throughout the year, and the
highest susceptibility was shown from late summer to
late autumn [14]. By contrast, the first outbreaks of
H5N1 in chicken farms in Hong Kong were reported
from March 1997 to May 1997, and the first outbreak
after 1997 occurred in May 2001 [15]. In the Korean
epidemic of 2008, the index case of HPAI (H5N1) was
confirmed in April, and it spread throughout Korea
through sales of chicks at traditional markets in May
[16]. Similarly in 2014, with the progression of the
H5N8 HPAI epidemic, the outbreaks spread to small
holders and to nonmajor species of poultry. For those
reasons, poulterers at traditional markets, and mid-
dlemen and their moorings, were also involved and led
to spontaneous outbreaks even during the summer.
As in the previous four epidemics of HPAI that
occurred in Korea [15,17], this epidemic of H5N8
proved to be associated with migratory birds. As 77% of
duck farms of Korea are located in the western part of
the country [18], poultry farms can hardly be free from
the risk of HPAI introduced via migratory birds flying
from the north and south of Eastern Asia. The best way
to overcome this geographical factor is to reinforce
biosecurity to prevent exposure of farms, related people,
and poultry to the pathogen. The importance of public
relations and education about biosecurity and hygiene to
block HPAI cannot be emphasized enough.Conflicts of interest
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